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Abstract: The economic crisis that has invested Europe since 2008 and the political crisis that 
peaked in the hot Greek summer of 2015 exposed the fractures and conflicts within the EU, but 
also within Europe at large. Arguably, this has led to a repositioning of Europe in the world, 
which is still ongoing. This reconfiguration of the internal European space happens in connec-
tion with the redefinition of the relations that Europe entertains with its outside (Moisio et al. 
2013). Also, the crises have shown that ‘Europe’ means different things in different places. In 
this paper, it is argued that classical European studies need to be rethought accordingly: it is 
no longer possible (and perhaps never was) to conceive of Europe in hermetic categories, but 
European space and politics need to be re-conceptualized as heterogeneous and uneven, and this 
always in connection with the transformations happening beyond the artificial idea of Europe as a 
defined continent (Manners, 2012). Following the call of Jean and John Comaroff (J. Comaroff & J. L. 
Comaroff 2012), this paper argues that there is a need to look at transformations in contemporary 
Europe as a consequence of restructuring happening in other parts of the world. The uneven 
development characterizing today’s Eurozone may be read as a return of colonial relations or 
unfettered capitalism to Europe.
Key words: Europe, Crisis, Space, Colonial Relations, Globalization
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The economic crisis that has invested the world including Europe since 2008 and the political 
crisis that peaked in the hot Greek summer of 2015 have exposed the fractures and conflicts 
within the EU and Europe at large. This has arguably led to a multi-faceted repositioning of 
‘Europe’ in the world, the exact nature of which we still do not understand well enough. To be 
sure, the process is far from being accomplished. We are hence pursuing a task that involves a 
moving target. Yet most importantly for the argument that this paper would like to put forward, 
the reconfiguration of the internal European space has clearly happened in connection with a 
redefinition of the relations that Europe entertains with its outside.1 In fact, all too simple inside/
outside views of Europe are no longer (if they ever have been) of much explanatory value. 
Smith has looked at “how understanding the transformation of European macro-regional spaces 
requires, at the same time, an understanding of the inter-relationships between those spaces 
and the wider world”, emphasizing how EU policy frameworks produce relations of increasing 
inter-dependency between Europe and the rest of the world, relations which are at the same 
time uneven.2 Inter-dependency is, according to Smith, first of all demonstrated by the fact that 
the economic crisis of 2008 was transmitted to Europe from the United States. As Fitoussi and 
Saraceno do when they talk about a Berlin-Washington consensus, Smith also agrees that not 
only the crisis, but the states’ responses to it in the form of austerity programs, were also imported 
to Europe from the United States.3 As a consequence, “The Eurozone dimension of the crisis is 
fundamentally challenging the EU’s commitment to cohesion and solidarity”.4 Responses to the 
crisis have also been characterized by interconnectedness across continents, from the Spanish 
indignados to the Greek anti-austerity movement to the different Occupy movements in Europe 
and beyond. For Smith, “Elite and popular responses to the crisis are but part of the attempts to 
manage European and global inter-dependencies”.5 
The fact that the Eurozone crisis has shown openly that European integration is driven and 
strongly influenced not only by internal factors, but by the interaction, or the relation, between 
internal and external processes poses a theoretical challenge. Indeed, the question here is not 
so much one of rethinking the EU’s external relations or its influence in the world. It is instead 
1  Sami Moisio et al.: Mapping the Political Geographies of Europeanization. National Discourses, External Perceptions 
and the Question of Popular Culture, in: Progress in Human Geography 37 (2013), 737-761, doi: 10.1177/0309132512472093.
2  Adrian Smith: Europe and an Inter-Dependent World. Uneven Geo-Economic and Geo-Political Developments, in: 
European Urban and Regional Studies 20 (2013), 3–13.
3  Jean-Paul Fitoussi/Francesco Saraceno: European Economic Governance. The Berlin-Washington Consensus, in:  
Cambridge Journal of Economics 37 (2013), 479–496.
4  Smith, Europe and an Inter-Dependent World (2013), 3–13.
5  Smith, Europe and an Inter-Dependent World (2013), 4.
Europe after the Crisis: Quo Vadis? 
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rather one of thinking the uneven production of the European space through the relations this 
space entertains with other spaces in the world. This is not only an empirical challenge, but it 
is an epistemological one, since it forces us to challenge the categories and the theories through 
which we have mainly studied European integration up to the present. This is why the present 
paper points to the consequentiality between the situation that has been exposed by the European 
crisis and the need to expand the paradigms dominating European studies. The need to go be-
yond understandings of Europe and of European integration that work taking for granted an 
inside/outside division of social, legal, economic and political relations has been acknowledged 
by several political geographers. Indeed, as Moisio et al. write:
 
“The crisis in Europe has led to a repositioning of ‘Europe in the world’[…] although ‘the 
geopolitical and geo-economic orbit of the EU’ had become in recent years ‘tangible’, 
there is now ‘a widespread sense that things have gone awry’. The events of 2011 have 
in fact highlighted not only the power of EU institutions to transform seemingly domes-
tic economic and political issues into ‘all-European’ matters, but have also resulted in a 
wholesale remaking of a distinct ‘European’ political space, not just within but also vis-
à-vis its putative ‘outside’”.6
Rethinking the production of Europe, as well as the restructuring of the European political and 
geographical space through its relations with other spaces and continents, entails at the same 
time a provincialization of Europe and of European studies. Indeed, what we witness with the 
Eurozone crisis is not only the growing relationality of European integration with other phenom-
ena taking place elsewhere in the world, which could be read as a consequence of globalization. 
Here, the hypothesis the paper makes is that experiences, political experiments, concepts and 
epistemological paradigms that have originated elsewhere, including the developing world, are 
‘coming back’ to Europe and are most appropriate to describe processes of regional restructuring 
that are taking place in Europe. Our call is thus one for reappraising European studies through 
theories, broadly understood, from the South as well as from the East.7 
This call follows similar attempts to de-center European studies, such as the one of Onar and 
Nicolaïdis,8 as well as attempts to enlarge the scientific paradigms used to think about European 
6  Moisio et al., Mapping the Political Geographies of Europeanization (2013).
7  Jean Comaroff /John L. Comaroff: Theory from the South or How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa, Paradigm 
Pub, 2012.
8  Nora Fischer Onar/Kalypso Nicolaïdis: The Decentring Agenda. Europe as a Post-Colonial Power, in: Cooperation and 
Conflict 48 (2013), 283–303.
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integration after the crisis, such as the one of Manners and Whitman.9 Onar and Nicolaïdis call for 
the integration of post-colonial perspectives within European studies, given the need to rethink 
Europe in a non-European world. The Eurocentrism that dominates the study of European inte-
gration has its roots, according to the authors, in the relation between European studies and the 
dominance of North-American paradigms in the field of international relations: “Eurocentrism 
was thus embedded in a broader western-centrism with two twists: not all western-centrism is 
Eurocentric; and some forms of Eurocentrism patently challenge American-centrism”.10 Following 
and expanding on Onar and Nicolaïdis, we argue that the Eurozone crisis puts into question the 
Eurocentrism of European integration theories, since it does not take into account how the crisis 
could be better explained by tackling the policy instruments and the uneven economic and so-
cial relations that are “coming back” from the developing world to Europe. Indeed, Onar and 
Nicolaïdis argue for the need of multidisciplinary perspectives going beyond the inside/outside 
divide to revive the study of European integration: 
“The aim of this contribution is to amplify the call for this necessary paradigm shift in 
the study and practice of Europe’s international relations, as inspired by the multiple 
and intertwined logics that infuse the growing body of multidisciplinary work regarding 
thinking outside of the Eurocentric box”. 11 
The need to complement existing approaches to the study of European integration and, more 
broadly of Europe, with new perspectives is also stressed by Manners and Whitman. They discuss 
the contradiction between the empirical level and the conceptual developments in the studies 
of European integration. The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the limits of liberal intergovern-
mentalist policies, whereas they are one of the mainstream approaches to European studies: 
“Mainstream EU scholarship broadly accepts the premise that the EU is a neoliberal, state-like 
political system and that Europeanisation is a one-way process”.12 In times of crisis, as the authors 
write, it is even more critical to leave room for a social sciences approach that can provide in-
sights that go beyond the existing status of European studies. 
The following sections sketch out some ideas to move on with the program of pluralizing and 
decentering European studies, taking into account the contradictions that emerged during the 
Eurozone crisis. In the first section, the paper looks for conceptual resources to think about 
9  Ian Manners/Richard Whitman: Another Theory is Possible. Dissident Voices in Theorising Europe, in: Journal of  
Common Market Studies 54 (2015), 3–18.
10  Fischer Onar/Nicolaïdis, The Decentring Agenda (2013), 283–303.
11  Fischer Onar/Nicolaïdis, The Decentring Agenda (2013), 285.
12  Manners/Whitman, Another Theory is Possible (2015), 3–18.
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a relational approach that does not presuppose Europe and other continents as separate but 
interrelated entities and thus looks at the relations among them as relations that produce the 
European space in a dialectical process. We focus in particular on the work of Henri Lefebvre and, 
partially, on the work of Giovanni Arrighi.
The paper then moves to discussing the Greek crisis of 2010, and in particular we look at the 
Economic Adjustment Programs (EAPs) of the Troika. It focuses on the example for Greece and 
of the first Memorandum in particular for matters of space, but it would be advisable to include 
the other European EAPs and the succession of different Memoranda in the Greek case. It then 
points to the fact that EAPs share most of their features with Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) 
that were applied in the 1980s by the World Bank and the IMF to Latin America and, since the 
end of the 1970s to Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as in the 1990s to Asian countries. The 
paper raises three questions. One concerns the actors, and in particular the role of the IMF in the 
Greek bailout; the second question concerns the policy instrument: why did the Troika use EAPs 
and conditionality in the EU when criticism about their efficiency in the developing world was 
well known by 2010? The third question concerns the content of the EAPs: which are the effects 
of these measures? Are they in line with EU law? The observation the paper wants to make is very 
simple: if EAPs are similar policy instruments to SAPs, why is the literature on SAPs not taken 
into account when dealing with the Eurozone crisis? The EU elite’s responses to the crisis demon-
strate the strong interconnectedness with solutions applied to the Eurozone with measures and 
contexts of the developing countries. This leads us to ask why the literature on these processes 
coming from developing countries is not taken into account in European studies. 
Reference to the work of the economist and historian of economy Giovanni Arrighi is very sel-
dom made when discussing the contemporary restructuring of the European Union. If his work 
has been used by some economists to describe the current patterns of the Eurozone crisis within 
Europe,13 reference is made even more rarely to his insights into the correlation between the 
restructuring of the nation-state system in Europe and in the United States and transformations 
in other continents.14 
13  Francesca Gambarotto/Stefano Solari: The Peripheralization of Southern European Capitalism within the EMU, in: 
Review of International Political Economy 22, Nr. 4 (2015): 788–812. doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.955518.
14  Andreas Bieler: The EU, Global Europe, and Processes of Uneven and Combined Development. The Problem of  
Transnational Labour Solidarity, in: Review of International Studies 39 (2012), Cambridge University Press, 161–183.
Europe in the World: Relational Approaches
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In his article on the withering away of the inter-state system and the rise of East Asia, Arrighi 
makes some important contributions to a “relational” approach of statehood transformation.15 
He criticizes mainstream globalization theories for associating the crisis of the nation-state sys-
tem with the emergence of transnational treaties, forms of governance and transnational corpo-
rations and with regionalism, such as the creation of economic blocks like the EU and NAFTA. For 
Arrighi, these approaches overlook at least three main factors: the connection between changes 
in the Western nation-states system and transformations in other parts of the world, such as in 
East Asia; the fact that East Asia, as a region, and China, as its main power, form a system that he 
defines as “quasi-state”, and that they do not mirror the process of transnationalization described 
by globalization scholars; and the fact that, historically, the nation-state is not the “pinnacle 
of legitimate authority”.16 Indeed, the nation-state is not, historically, the leading formation of 
modern capitalism, which was dominated instead either by
“organizations that are something less (city states and quasi-states) or something more 
(quasi-empires) […]. World power came instead to be concentrated in structurally differ-
entiated governmental and non-governmental organizations that reproduce on a larger 
scale and in incomparably more complex forms many of the traits of pre- and early- 
modern modes of rule and accumulation”.17 
What we will retain from Arrighi’s analysis is the relevance of studying the transformations of 
the Western statehood system in connection with the changes in other regional systems in the 
world, as well as his attention to forms that are in-between clear political structures, such as 
quasi-states, and his historically attuned mode of analysis. 
Central to our approach to changes in the spatial and territorial dimension of Europe as a form 
of statehood is the work of Henri Lefebvre and its most recent interpretations.18 For the French 
geographer, the process of co-production of space and statehood not only takes place within the 
state, but also through the relations that the state entertains with the global space:
“As the product, the child, of a space, the so-called national territory, the state turns 
back toward its own historical conditions and antecedents, and transforms them. 
Subsequently, the state engenders social relations in space; it reaches still further as it 
15  Giovanni Arrighi: The Rise of East Asia and the Withering Away of the Interstate System, in: Journal of World-Systems 
Research 2, Nr. 1 (2015): 456–478. doi:10.5195/jwsr.1996.68.
16  Giovanni Arrighi, The Rise of East Asia (2015), 461.
17  Giovanni Arrighi, The Rise of East Asia (2015), 473.
18  Neil Brenner: Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical. Henri Lefebvre’s Geographies of Globalization, in: Public Culture 10 
(1997), 135–167.
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unfurls; it produces a support, its own space, which is itself complex. This space regulates 
and organizes a disintegrating national space at the heart of a consolidating global space 
(l’espace mondial)”. 19 
For Lefebvre, “The state and territory interact in such a way that they can be said to be mutually 
constitutive”.20 More precisely, Lefebvre identifies specific modes of production through which 
statehood produces its own territory as well as forms of territorial domination outside its own 
frontiers. The capitalist space is at the same time homogeneous and fractured:
“The current mode of production is characterized by the space of state control (control 
étatique), which is simultaneously a space of exchange. The space thus engendered is  
‘social’ in the sense that it is not a thing among things, but the system (l’ensemble) of 
links, connections, networks, and circuits”.21 
Lefebvre uses the concept of mondialisation to express the expansion of the statehood produc-
tion of territory outside at the worldwide level:
“A worldwide integration (mondialisation) of production and production cycles is now 
occurring. […] The accumulation of investments and productive capital is occurring on a 
world-scale. […]  A globalization of labor flows, of technology, of expertise is also taking 
place. […]  The production of a planetary space likewise ensues, whose frontiers oscillate 
between visibility and invisibility, and in which national states have until now main-
tained their functions – control and hierarchization (of dominant-dominated spaces), 
regulation”.22 
Nevertheless, the two concepts of the global and of “mondial” are very different: 
“Lefebvre is suggesting that the global is a level, while the worldwide is a scale. The global 
(level) refers to a mode of analysis that is focused on the general or the whole; it is linked 
to understandings of totality and stands in contrast to more specific levels of analysis. By 
contrast, Lefebvre conceives the world wide (scale) as a basis for recognizing the simulta-
neous extension, differentiation, and fragmentation of social relations across the entire 
earth under contemporary capitalism, a process he also attempts to describe with refer-
ence to mathematician Rene Thorn’s notion of a “hierarchical stratified morphology”.23 
19  Henri Lefebvre: Space and the State, in: Neil Brenner/Bob Jessop/Martin Jones/Gordon MacLeod (Ed.): State/Space:  
A Reader. Malden MA, USA 2003, 84–100.
20  Lefebvre, Space and the State (1997), 87.
21  Lefebvre, Space and the State (1997), 93.
22  Lefebvre, Space and the State (1997), 97.
23  Henri Lefebvre: State, Space, World. Minneapolis, 2009, 23.
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Through the term of “mondial”, Lefebvre refers therefore to the relations of homogenization, of 
hierarchization and of fragmentation across different scales, and to the associated relations. It 
is thus a very different understanding of the links between territory and statehood production 
and transnational relations than the one of mainstream globalization theories.24 One of the main 
differences with respect to globalization theories is that Lefebvre’s writings provide a basis for 
reading contemporary geopolitical developments as a process of territory production, thus in 
opposition to theories of deterritorialization. Relations and modes of production – of commod-
ities, but also of statehood and of territory and space – are at the center of the restructuring of 
statehood at the level of the worldwide: “Through these interactions, the world market outlines 
configurations that are inscribed on the terrestrial surface of changing spaces. Hence the con-
tradictions in space and of space, between countries, peoples, classes”.25 The question Lefebvre 
frames is therefore how territory and space are produced at the level of transnational relations, 
by whom, for which purpose and which are the hierarchies and forms they shape. Europe is one 
of the main geopolitical spaces taking action and shaping the worldwide:
 “Spatial planning deals with flows: of energy, raw materials, money, the labor force, vari-
ous goods, mixtures of people and things, signs, information and understanding, symbols, 
capital, etc. It endeavors to connect and coordinate these multiple flows in space. In which 
space? In great geopolitical units (Europe, etc.) that are inscribed in the worldwide”.26 
Space is thus a social and political instrument, and it becomes a site for the reproduction of social 
relations and of political hierarchies. 
Together with the analysis of the homogenization, fragmentation and hierarchization of space 
in a transnational perspective, it is possible to build upon Lefebvre’s work on the concept of 
“colonization”. Indeed, Lefebvre provides a notion of colonization as multi-scalar, operating at 
the inter-national, inter-regional and intra-regional levels: 
“Lefebvre also links his account of state space to a multi-scalar interpretation of newly emer-
gent patterns of neocolonialism and uneven spatial development (…). Outside established 
states, the political decolonization of European empires is replaced with a still more insidi-
ous form of colonization, one in which dominant states and multinationals impose relations 
of dependence and hierarchy within and beyond these new so-called independent states”.27 
24  Neil Brenner: Globalisation as Reterritorialisation. The Re-Scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union, in: 
Urban Studies 36 (1999), 431–451.
25  Lefebvre, State, Space, World (2009), 105.
26  Lefebvre, State, Space, World (2009), 201.
27  Lefebvre, State, Space, World (2009), 23.
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In Lefebvre’s work from the 1970s onwards,  “colonization” describes a state strategy of pro-
ducing space and in particular a certain state-bound form of organizing hierarchical territorial 
relations.28 What is distinctive about Lefebvre’s concept of “colonization” is that it is a spatial 
practice that, even if tied to statehood, it is in no way only bounded to the nation-state: “In twentieth- 
century neo-capitalism and neo-imperialism, formal decolonization goes hand in hand with a 
‘world-wide extension of the colonial phenomenon’”.29 
On April 27th 2009, the European Council declared that Greece was in a situation of excessive 
deficit.30 Indeed, the European Commission’s forecast for 2009 projected the deficit 4.4% of GDP 
in excess of the 3% limit of the Stability Pact. The situation of the Greek deficit in 2007, the year 
of the global financial crisis; was of 3.5% of GDP. In the decade that followed the introduction of 
the euro, the Greek economy was growing at a rate of 4.5% a year and was depicted as a success 
story.31 The opinion of the European Council on Greece’s convergence and stability program was 
positive until 2008.32 This is why the rising of Greek deficit and public debt by the end of 2009 
came as a surprise, at least to the majority of the Greek population and to the citizens of the 
other European member states. Indeed, the conclusions of the European Council of December 
10th and 11th were moderately optimistic: “The economic situation is starting to show signs of sta-
bilization and confidence is increasing. Forecasts suggest a weak recovery in 2010, followed by a 
return to stronger growth in 2011”.33 If the convergence plan for Greece was evaluated as successful, 
nevertheless structural reforms taking into account labor market policy, state enterprises and 
social policies, were not sufficiently implemented in Greece.34 Greece closed the financial year 
28  Kanishka Goonewardena/Stefan Kipfer: Urban Marxism and the Post-Colonial Question. Henri Lefebvre and ‘Colonisa-
tion’, in: Historical Materialism 21 (2013), 76–116.
29  Goonewardena/Kipfer, Urban Marxism (2013), 97.
30  European Union Council, Council Decision of 27 April 2009 on the Existence of an Excessive Deficit in Greece, 2009.
31  Vassilis Monastiriotis: Austerity Measures in Crisis Countries. Results and Impact on Mid-Term Development, in: Inter-
economics 48 (2013), 4–32.
32  European Union Council, Council Opinion of 4 March 2008 on the Updated Stability Programme of Greece, 2007-2010, 
Brussels, 2008.
33  European Union Council, European Council 10/11 December 2009 Conclusions, 2009.
34  Panos Kazakos: Europeanisation, Public Goals and Group Interests. Convergence Policy in Greece, 1990-2003, in: West 
European Politics 27 (2004), 901–918.
Rethinking Europe through Structural 
Adjustment Plans: The Case of the Greek 
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2009 with a budget deficit of 15.8% (which, at the time, was estimated at 12.7%).35 These fig-
ures were revealed on 20 October 2009 by George Papakonstantinou, the newly elected finance 
minister: “he announced a tripling of the level of government debt for 2009”.36 He was the min-
ister of the socialist government led by Pasok and George Papandreou, a government whose 
election followed the one of Costas Karamanlis and of the center-right party of New Democracy. 
Papakonstantinou revealed that the figures concerning a public deficit of 3.6% of GDP reported 
by the previous government were inaccurate: “it was upgraded to 12.8 per cent of GDP, then 
increased further to 13.6 per cent when further calculations were made in 2010 (22 April)”.37 
According to art. 104(6) of the Maastricht Treaty,38 it is the European Council, upon recommenda-
tion from the Commission, that needs to decide about the assessment in case of excessive deficit. 
On May 10, 2010, the Council adopted a Decision concerning measures Greece should adopt to 
reduce its deficit and debt. Moreover, as is well known, art. 104 of the Treaty establishes that the 
European Central Bank and the national central banks cannot dispense solutions for debt of EU 
member states or EU public bodies. As Featherstone reconstructs it, after the announcement 
made by Papakonstantinou and as soon as it became clear from the markets that Greece was 
heading towards default, a conflict concerning the interpretation of art. 104 of the Maastricht 
treaty arose. Indeed, “Merkel displayed a consistency of view with the ‘narrow’ German stance at 
Maastricht”39 insisting that a bailout of Greece would also cause legal problems with the German 
Constitutional Court. At the same time, the fact that there was no procedure to expel a state that 
does not comply with the fiscal rules of Maastricht created an imbalance between Germany’s 
position and the position of those asking for an economic government of the Eurozone. At first, 
Ecofin’s response to Greece was that they should sort the situation out themselves. It was only 
on March 26th, 2010, “that the euro area leaders, meeting at the European Council, agreed the 
principles of a rescue deal for Greece (based on funding being shared between the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), contributing one-third, and EU states two-thirds). However, this would only 
be available to Greece if all states agreed it and if all other options had been clearly exhausted”.40
35  Vassilis Monastiriotis: Austerity Measures in Crisis Countries. Results and Impact on Mid-term Development, in: Inter-
economics 48 (2013), 4–32.
36  Kevin Featherstone: The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU. A Failing State in a Skewed Regime, in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 49 (2011), 193–217.
37  Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis (2011), 199.
38  European Union Council und European Commission, Treaty on European Union.
39  Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis (2011), 193–217.=
40  Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis (2011), 202.
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The participation of the IMF was an object of debate from the beginning of the Greek crisis. 
The Greek Minister of Finance, Papakonstantinou, in March 2010 requested “immediate initia-
tives”, warning that otherwise “the only solution, the only possible solution, would be the IMF”.41 
Indeed, what is striking is that both the European institutions and heads of states, and the IMF 
had serious doubts about the IMF’s involvement in the Greek bailout. “One reason the IMF’s 
participation was troubled was because initially Europe wanted to keep the fund at a distance”, 
wrote Reuters journalists in their investigation concerning the role of the IMF in the Greek debt 
crisis.42 From the side of France, the involvement of the IMF was seen as a sign of weakness of 
the Eurozone: “the Europeans wanted to keep the Greek problem in-house. Paris, in particular, 
opposed bringing in the fund”. George Papakonstantinou, Greece’s finance minister from 2009 
to 2011, remembers French President Nikolas Sarkozy “telling us ‘I will never allow the IMF in 
Europe’”. Christine Lagarde, then France’s finance minister and now head of the IMF, agreed 
with Sarkozy. Her view, she told Reuters in an interview, was “predicated on the hope that the 
Europeans could put together enough of a package, enough ring-fencing, enough of a backstop 
so as to show that Europe could sort out its own affairs”.43 According to Reuters, Germany, and 
Merkel in particular, was more favorable to the IMF intervention: “German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, according to her aides, saw the ECB and the European Commission – the EU’s top 
executive body – as soft and vulnerable to political influence. She began insisting that the IMF be 
brought into the Greek bailout”.44 Instead, according to Costas Simitis (Socialist Prime Minister of 
Greece from 1996 to 2004), Germany wanted to solve the Greek debt crisis internally, within the 
EU, so that “the standing and the stature of the Eurozone would remain intact […] avoiding the 
humiliating excessive intervention of the IMF”.45 As borrowing rates started climbing towards 
10%, Greece asked its Eurozone and IMF partners for an emergency loan – a bailout package – and 
in May 2010 it was granted a loan worth a staggering €110bn, in a move that seemed to violate 
all EMU principles and of a size that surpassed that of the loans granted to Europe under the 
Marshall Plan. With this loan (and subsequent ones) came a strict and pervasive conditionality 
for the implementation of a broad range of reforms and fiscal consolidation actions. 
41  Costas Simitis: The European Debt Crisis, Manchester, 2014, 40.
42  Lesley Wroughton/Howard Schneider/Dina Kyriakidou: How the IMF’s Misadventure in Greece is Changing the Fund, 
in: Reuters Investigates (2015)  
URL: http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/imf-greece, (29.3.2016).
43  Wroughton/Schneider/Kyriakidou, IMF’s Misadventure in Greece (2015).
44  Wroughton/Schneider/Kyriakidou, IMF’s Misadventure in Greece (2015).
45  Simitis, The European Debt Crisis (2014), 42.
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During the Eurogroup of May, 2nd, 2010, “Euro area ministers unanimously agreed to activate 
stability support to Greece via bilateral loans centrally pooled by the European Commission” 
(Statement by the Eurogroup, May 2nd 2010).46 The agreement was then approved by the Greek 
Cabinet as well as by Eurozone finance ministers. On May 6th the agreement became law in a vote 
by the Athens Parliament. 
The main elements of the 2010 bailout agreement are as follows: 
1. A loan of €110 billion was approved, of which €80 billion are intergovernmental loans pledged 
by the Eurozone countries and €30 billion by the IMF; approximately two-thirds of this amount 
will be used to repay bonds and loans and to support the Greek banking system through the 
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. The European Commission acts as coordinator of the Greek 
loan facility, as well as administrator and disbursement counter on behalf of the Member States. 
The bailout package is strictly conditional upon the implementation of severe austerity meas-
ures, the attainment of specific fiscal targets, as well as extensive liberalization and privatiza-
tion measures. The disbursement of the loan is to be made in 13 tranches, each conditional on 
a review of fiscal developments. In the Economic Adjustment Plan drafted by the Commission, 
the reforms upon which the loan is conditional are outlined in detail. 
2. The short-term program aims concern Greece’s financial stability: “consolidation should rely 
on measures that generate savings in public sector expenditure and improve the govern-
ment’s revenue-raising capacity”.47 
3. Structural reforms are the second element of the Economic Adjustment Plan, aiming at the 
modernization of the public sector, at rendering “product and labor markets more efficient 
and flexible”, and at creating “a more open and accessible business environment” through a 
“reduction of the state’s direct participation in domestic industries”.48 
4. In particular, to attain these general aims, the EAP includes the need to reform the pen-
sions system and to cut wages in both the public and the private sector. As the EAP reads: 
“Large cuts in public wages and pensions are inevitable (…) Cuts in average wages and 
pensions are therefore indispensable to achieve the required adjustment, even taking into 
account the authorities’ commitment to reduce employment and control wage drift or 
freeze the indexation of pensions”.49
46  Statement by the Eurogroup, Brussels, 2010.  
URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100502-%20Eurogroup_statement.pdf.
47  Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Program-
me for Greece, Brussels, European Commission, 2010, 10.
48  Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Program-
me for Greece, Brussels, European Commission, 2010, 10.
49  Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Program-
me for Greece, Brussels, European Commission, 2010, 15.
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5. The measures contained in the 2010 EAP, as well as the involvement of the IMF, produced 
a negative reaction in Greek public opinion. On May 5th 2010, large demonstrations took 
place all over the country.50 The social reactions were not considered when drafting the 
Memorandum, as is evident from its overall tone.51
By early 2011, it became clear that the program’s fiscal targets could not be attained, both because 
a strong recession had set in and because the fundamental causes of the Greek malaise were not 
addressed. 
Bailout II – As financial market pressure spread to other countries of the Eurozone periphery, 
endangering the viability of the single currency, the EU decided to grant Greece a second bail-
out, along the lines of the previous one in terms of austerity measures, but with a new twist; 
the involvement of private investors in a ‘voluntary restructuring’ of the securitized part of the 
Greek public debt. The second bailout amounted to a €130 billion loan until 2014, including an 
IMF contribution of €28 billion.
The main features of the second bailout agreement are as follows: 
1. Additional fiscal austerity measures; 
2. The incorporation into the Greek constitution of a provision, whereby priority is given to 
debt-servicing payments over other types of public expenditure; 
3. An ‘enhanced and permanent presence’ of the Task Force already established under the first 
bailout agreement, overseeing the implementation of austerity measures. This reports direct-
ly to the Troika, bypassing the Greek government; 
4. Political assurances from the leaders of the two major political parties at the time, that they 
will observe and implement the agreement irrespective of political developments. 
As Greer has remarked,52 there are several similarities between the EAPs that have been adopted 
in the Eurozone, and the Structural Adjustment Plans that the IMF has previously applied to 
developing countries. As Greer argues: 
50  Simitis, The European Debt Crisis (2014), 56.
51  Simitis, The European Debt Crisis (2014), 59.
52  Scott Greer: Structural Adjustment Comes to Europe. Lessons for the Eurozone from the Conditionality Debates, in: 
Global Social Policy 14 (2014), 51–71.
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“EAPs and SAPs are similar instruments: concentrated lists of reforms that come at the 
price of financial rescue. They contain much substantive similarity and employ under- 
lying approaches to the state. They come amidst shock, and might have shock effects 
themselves. As a result, they can be studied as a policy instrument and we can infer the 
likely effects of EAPs from the experience of SAPs”.53 
SAPs were implemented by International Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and 
during the 1980s SAPs targeted especially Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Following Greer, we argue that despite the clear differences between the states and the econo-
mies where SAPs where applied in the 1980s and 1990s and the ones where the EAPs are applied 
by the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, the use of the policy in-
strument is consistent: “conditional loans, used by international governmental organizations to 
promote a consistent list of economic policies”.54
If the policy instrument used in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in Latin America and 
South and East Asia, is consistent, then we can raise two questions. The first one concerns what 
we can learn for the Eurozone from the evaluation of the effects of SAPs. The second question 
concerns the use of a policy instrument that was intended for use in developing countries in a 
different context than that of the Eurozone. 
The main characteristics that are shared between EAPs, and in particular EAPs as they are applied 
in Greece, and SAPs as they were largely applied in Africa are the following:
1. Trade openness
2. Liberalization of domestic trade 
3. Reform of fiscal policy
4. The privatization of state-owned enterprises
5. Reform of the financial sector
6. Sectorial reforms of areas such as pensions, health and labor law
As made famous by Williamson in his paper on the “Washington consensus” (1990), the measures 
contained in the SAPs responded to a coherent agenda “that sought to make economies stronger 
53  Greer, Lessons for the Eurozone (2014), 52.
54  Greer, Lessons for the Eurozone (2014), 52.
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and more stable by reducing the size of the state, promoting exports, and making more use of 
price signals in the economy”.55 Conditionality, by which is understood the subordination of the 
loan to the realization of specific economic, social and political reforms, has been one of the 
most criticized aspects of IMF interventions in the case of SAPs. Conditionality has a non-demo-
cratic aspect, since, as is clearly stated in the Greek 2010 Memorandum and is reinforced in the 
following ones, it freezes the possibility, for the governments, to change the direction of reforms 
for the duration of the program. Why, despite the critiques that the use of conditionality by the 
IMF in Africa, Latin America and Asia, was it proposed again in the Eurozone? What can we learn 
from past experiences of application of this tool in other non-European contexts?
In particular, the effects and the efficiency of structural adjustment plans was deeply contro-
versial when these policy instruments were applied in developing countries. One of the main 
questions that arises is thus why these critiques where not considered when applying similar 
measures to Greece and other Eurozone countries.56 
MOUs take the form of a legal agreement between the Troika and the member state, but they are 
not beyond the scope of EU law. Social provisions in general, and labor law in particular, have 
been one of the main targets of MOUs, as is described in the previous paragraphs. According 
to Adams and Deakin there is no basis, in the limited social policy competencies of the EU, to 
intervene to the extent that MOUs are doing in reshaping national level labor-law.57 As they 
argue, several judgments of the Luxembourg Court stress the limited powers of the Union to 
impose common standards in the area of collective labor law. The legitimacy of MOUs may thus 
sooner or later be challenged by the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
The problematic aspects of MOUs are not only legal, but their effectiveness can, at present, be 
seriously challenged. Growing inequality and social deprivation are among the effects of MOUs. 
Unemployment remained at rates of 24% in Greece during the years of the application of MOUs. 
These effects are in line with those of SAPs in developing countries.58
55  Greer, Lessons for the Eurozone (2014), 53.
56  Zoe Adams/Simon Deakin: Structural Adjustment, Economic Governance and Social 
Policy in a Regional Context. The Case of the Eurozone Crisis, in: Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law,  
Cheltenham, 2015, 111–123.
57  Adams/Deakin, The Case of the Eurozone Crisis (2015), 116.
58  Adams/Deakin, The Case of the Eurozone Crisis (2015), 116.
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How it is possible to explain that a policy instrument that has been applied to developing coun-
tries with far from positive effects is then applied to Europe without taking into account the 
effects of uneven regional development that already existed in African countries, for example? 
Fitoussi and Saraceno argue that the European Union is the polity that has gone further in inter-
nalizing the Washington consensus.59
With regard to MOUs and SAPs, Fitoussi and Saraceno write that: “In addition, if we look at the 
experience of structural adjustment programs, the most surprising thing about a consensus so 
widespread in the academic and political communities is the scant evidence to support it”.60 
Fitoussi and Saraceno point to the fact that SAPs and MOUs apply the same policy instruments 
and the same principles to different contexts, thus disregarding the specificity of the interaction 
between institutions and markets in each context. More precisely, 
“In the field of development as well, the BW Consensus has substantially failed the em-
pirical test. The last decades witnessed some extraordinarily successful stories and some 
tragic failures. All of them had complex causes, proving wrong the notion that the insti-
tutional model based on deregulated markets and small government is always superior to 
other models. It took many years, but it is nowadays clear that one size does not fit all”.61
59  Fitoussi/Saraceno, European Economic Governance (2013), 479–496.
60  Fitoussi/Saraceno, European Economic Governance (2013), 484.
61  Fitoussi/Saraceno, European Economic Governance (2013), 485.
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The present paper makes a call for a decentering of European studies that aims at unveiling and 
documenting the transnational connections that co-produce European spaces through uneven 
relations of mondialisation with the developing world. The Eurozone crisis makes evident the 
double process of fragmentation and uneven development, but also of homogenization that is re-
structuring Europe as a regional space, co-produced through its relations with other continents. 
The paper points to a possible avenue for European Global studies: bringing together relational 
approaches to space and statehood construction, such as those of Arrighi and Lefebvre with 
empirical case studies concerning EU integration, such as the management of the Greek crisis, 
could allow for a renewal of EU integration studies both from a theoretical and from an empirical 
perspective. As Randeria suggests, “the specificity of the current dynamics and trajectories of the 
transnationalization of law with dissimilar effects in various countries in different regions must 
be analyzed against the background of the colonial import, imposition and reconstitution of law 
in the non-Western world”.62 Probably, what Randeria says about legal processes can be extended 
to political, economic and social ones. To take into account the experiences that the Eurozone 
crisis is making evident, there is the need for a ‘relational’ rethinking of European studies. 
62  Shalini Randeria: The State of Globalization. Legal Plurality, Overlapping Sovereignties and Ambiguous Alliances 
between Civil Society and the Cunning State in India, in: Theory, Culture & Society 24 (2007), SAGE Publications, 1–33.
Conclusion: Towards European Global Studies
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